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ABSTRACT. The concept of resilience is widely promoted as a promising notion to guide new approaches
to ecosystem and resource management that try to enhance a system's capacity to cope with change. A
variety of mechanisms of resilience specific for different systems have been proposed. In the context of
resource management those include but are not limited to the diversity of response options and flexibility
of the social system to adaptively respond to changes on an adequate scale. However, implementation of
resilience-based management in specific real-world systems has often proven difficult because of a limited
understanding of suitable interventions and their impact on the resilience of the coupled social-ecological
system. We propose an agent-based modeling approach to explore system characteristics and mechanisms
of resilience in a complex resource management system, based on a case study of water use in the Amudarya
River, which is a semiarid river basin. Water resources in its delta are used to sustain irrigated agriculture
as well as aquatic ecosystems that provide fish and other ecosystem services. The three subsystems of the
social-ecological system, i.e., the social system, the irrigation system, and an aquatic ecosystem, are linked
by resource flows and the allocation decision making of actors on different levels. Simulation experiments
are carried out to compare the resilience of different institutional settings of water management to changes
in the variability and uncertainty of water availability. The aim is to investigate the influence of (1) the
organizational structure of water management, (2) information on water availability, and (3) the diversity
of water uses on the resilience of the system to short and long-term water scarcity. In this paper, the model
concept and first simulation results are presented. As a first illustration of the approach the performances
of a centralized and a decentralized regime are compared under different scenarios of information on water
availability. Under the given conditions of a regularly fluctuating inflow and compliance of agents with
orders from a national authority, the centralized system performs better as long as irrigation is the only
type of water use. Diversification of resource use, e.g., irrigation and fishing, increases the performance
of the decentralized regime and the resilience of both. Systematic analysis of the performance of different
system structures will help to identify properties and mechanisms of resilience. This understanding will be
valuable for the identification, development, and evaluation of management interventions in specific river
basins.
Key Words: adaptive management; agent-based model; Amudarya; diversification; fisheries; irrigation;
mechanism; resilience; river basin; social-ecological system; water use.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, resilience has been promoted as a
concept to guide the integrative study and
management of social-ecological systems. Resilience
is a property that reflects the capacity of a system
to cope with disturbance and reorganize while
undergoing change to maintain structure and
functioning (Walker et al. 2004). In complex
ecosystem or resource management contexts it is
often the nature of the interactions between the
social and the ecological or resource system that
determines the system’s capacity to adapt to change.
However, the role of linkages between the social
and ecological systems for resilience and factors and
mechanisms of resilience in a specific management
context are still little understood (Anderies et al.
2004, Perrings 2006). Most resilience studies in real
world systems are descriptive, empirical, ex-post
analyses of systems that underwent change (Janssen
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et al. 2006). To our knowledge to date little formal
analysis of properties and mechanisms that
influence a coupled system’s resilience has been
carried out, with the exception of models for
reasonably well defined ecosystems, e.g., Carpenter
et al. 1999, Janssen et al. 2000, 2004, Anderies 2000,
Janssen 2001, Anderies et al. 2002). Modeling
approaches, especially bottom-up approaches, are
valuable tools to explore mechanisms on lower
levels that might account for the emergence of
system level characteristics such as resilience.
Based on the management context of the Amudarya
River delta, we propose a bottom-up modeling
approach to explore structural characteristics and
mechanisms that influence the resilience of its
social-ecological system to uncertainty and
variability in water availability.
The concept of resilience originated in ecology
(Holling 1973) where it constitutes one of several
stability properties of ecosystems. Growing
recognition that ecosystem management has to
explicitly consider the human dimension and the
linkages between the social and ecological system
has shifted the focus of resilience analysis to social-
ecological systems (SES). In SES the dynamics of
the natural and the social systems are closely
intertwined and dependent on each other. They
consist of both designed and self-organized
components (Anderies et al. 2004) and behave as
complex adaptive systems (Folke et al. 2005). For
SES it is characteristic that some of the
interdependent relationships among humans are
mediated through interactions with the biophysical
environment or other nonhuman units, e.g.,
exploitation of a fish stock by several fishers.
Interactions between biophysical and social
processes, e.g., response of the social system to
perceived changes in the environment and visa-
versa, determine the capacity of the SES to
adaptively respond to stress.
In ecological systems resilience benefits from
diversity (Tilman et al. 1997, Levin et al. 1998,
Elmqvist et al. 2003, Folke et al. 2004). Diversity
may contribute to ecological resilience by adding
redundancy of functions within and across scales
(Peterson et al. 1998). Investigations of change in
social systems have suggested resilience mechanisms
similar to those in ecological systems such as the
capacity of the social system to maintain
institutional diversity and diversity amongst assets
(Perrings 2006), or to sustain memory (Anderies et
al. 2004). However, social systems are distinctly
different from ecological systems given the
information-processing capability of human actors,
and their ability to engage in purposeful action and
reflexive learning. Mechanisms specific for social
systems are for example, the capacity to adapt rules
when ecological conditions change (Anderies et al.
2004), and to develop a process of experimenting
systematically with alternative institutional
configurations. Model-based analyses of the
behavior of SES have often focused on either the
social or ecological component. A clear framework
for formal analysis of the coupled systems is still
missing (Anderies et al. 2002, 2006, Janssen et al.
2006). Few studies so far explicitly consider the
coupled system and how the dynamic nature of the
linkages between the ecological and social systems
affects resilience. Given the importance of
feedbacks between the two systems for learning and
adaptation we argue that more systematic analysis
of those linkages and their implications is needed.
We propose a bottom-up modeling approach that
explicitly addresses the two-way interactions
between the human actors represented by their
resource allocation decision making and the
environmental system in a river basin represented
by water resources and aquatic ecosystems. The
goal is to use the model to test various assumptions
on resilience mechanisms in a systematic way.
Agent-based modeling (ABM) approaches are
especially suitable methods for the analysis of
human-environment interactions in environmental
management (Janssen 2002, Gotts et al. 2003,
Bousquet and LePage 2004, Barreteau et al. 2004,
Janssen and Ostrom 2005) because they allow
explicit consideration of changes in the behavior of
individual actors that arise from perceived changes
in the natural or social environment. ABMs have
the advantage that social and institutional relations
between human actors can be represented at
different scales. They have been applied to the study
of irrigation systems e.g. by Barreteau et al. (2004)
who concluded that they constitute a suitable
architecture to study theoretically irrigated
systems’s viability using simulation.
Of the many potential factors that affect resilience
of the social-ecological system in a river basin we
want to focus on structural characteristics and
functional mechanisms of different water
management regimes. They are characterized by the
degree of distribution of decision making expressed
as the number of actors and organizational levels
involved in water allocation decisions, the degree
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of coordination among actors, the diversity of
resource use, and the level of information of actors.
Our interest in the effect of those characteristics is
motivated by the hypothesis that devolution of
decision making in combination with strong cross-
scale interactions between different levels of
management, i.e., multilevel governance, can make
systems more flexible and adaptive to change and
thus enhance resilience and sustainability (Pahl-
Wostl 2002, Folke et al. 2005, Lebel et al. 2006,
Walker et al. 2006, Pahl-Wostl et al. 2007).
In this paper we present the conceptual foundations
and structure of the agent-based model and an
example of its implementation. The main goal is to
present the potentials and limitations of using an
agent-based modeling approach to study the
behavior of SES and enhance our understanding of
the dynamics of system properties such as
resilience. The context of the water management
system is taken from the irrigation system in the
delta area of the Amudarya River in Central Asia.
The social-ecological system is modeled in a
stylized way focusing on major elements of the
system to allow for systematic analysis of the effect
of changes in the structure and institutions of the
social system on system resilience (for other
examples see Carpenter et al. 1999). To illustrate
the approach we compare two examples of
extremely simplified management regimes, i.e., a
centralized vs. a decentralized regime, and test the
effect of uncertainty of water availability and
diversification of water use on the resilience of both
regimes. We use the performance, e.g. agricultural
and fish production, of a regime under fluctuating
resource availability as a proxy for its resilience. It
is assumed that measures of system performance
indicate the maintenance or loss of functioning. In
a real management context identification of
indicators of resilience and decisions as to which
functions are desirable and should be retained
ultimately have to be carried out by the actors
themselves (see also Lebel et al. 2006). We use
resilience in a non normative way as a measure of
the capacity of the given social system to retain the
functionality of the agricultural production system,
to sustain all its members and the aquatic ecosystem.
The comparison of the two management extremes
will help to distinguish structural attributes and
functional characteristics of the interactions of
actors with resources, the ecosystem, and other
actors that are important for an adaptive response
of the social-ecological system to uncertainty and
change in water availability.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.
After a short description of the social-ecological
system that serves as a case study for this modeling
exercise, the general structure of the model is
described. It is then applied to a simple experimental
setting of two different water management regimes.
Their performances under different scenarios of
water use and availability of information of water
availability are compared. Finally, the results of this
experiment, the general model structure, and model
assumptions are discussed in view of the use of the
model to systematically analyze mechanisms of
resilience and conclusions are drawn.
THE SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL SYSTEM:
WATER USE IN THE AMUDARYA RIVER
BASIN
The irrigation systems in the Amudarya River basin
are among the most highly developed and complex
irrigation systems in the world (Fig. 1). More than
90% of the surface water resources are currently
used for irrigation. Water distribution in the delta
area is controlled by a reservoir at its entrance and
a network of canals diverting water to the irrigation
areas, farms, and fields. The inflow to the delta
varies strongly interannually, e.g., between 17 km3 
in 2001 and 59 km3 in 1998. In high and mean water
years, water availability is sufficient to serve
irrigation needs of all users in the delta. However,
in low water years the demand exceeds availability,
and users experience water shortages. In high water
years, excess water is diverted into an
interconnected system of deltaic lakes to store it for
later use or into depressions in the desert. A variety
of agricultural crops are cultivated, but cotton,
wheat, and rice dominate. The massive expansion
of irrigated agriculture has caused severe
degradation of riverine ecosystems and impacted
the economic and health situation of the local human
population. In the delta area of the river, water
withdrawals for irrigation conflict with the supply
of water to sustain semiarid deltaic ecosystems. The
livelihoods of the local human population depend
to a large extent on services provided by those
ecosystems, e.g., by deltaic lakes in the form of fish,
livestock fodder, and habitat for muskrat and bird
hunting, or riverine Tugai forests for wood, pasture,
and medicinal plants. In this harsh semiarid
environment, the linkages between the social and
the ecological system are very strong. Current
mono-purpose water management has caused
severe degradation of the ecosystems and livelihood
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options of the local human population. At present
water allocation is managed in a centralized way
with the national authorities of the riverine countries
taking all major allocation decisions. Water needs
of sectors other than agriculture, e.g., industry, fish
farming, etc., are only marginally considered.
The given situation in the Amudarya River delta is
an interesting case for the study of resilience
mechanisms of coupled social-ecological systems.
Both, water resources and harvested fish
populations in the deltaic lakes are common pool
resources. Thus, there is a need for collective action
to manage the common goods (Ostrom 1990).
Historically, top-down approaches with strong
involvement of the government have been
considered appropriate in common goods
management to prevent overuse of the resources. In
water management, especially in irrigated
catchments, there is traditionally substantial
involvement of the government (Dinar et al. 1997).
However, many large-scale irrigation schemes have
failed (Ostrom 1992). Unresolved tradeoffs in water
allocation between different users have often caused
strong degradation of ecosystems with severe
consequences for the social-ecological system as a
whole. The new realities of water management in
the Amudarya River basin created by the recent
ongoing political and economic changes have lead
to the introduction of some bottom-up management
elements such as water user associations into the
otherwise top-down managed system (Yalcin and
Mollinga 2006).
THE MODEL
The social-ecological system in the delta area is
represented by three subsystems: the social system,
the irrigation system, and the aquatic ecosystem
(Fig. 2). The available water resources support both
the irrigation system and the aquatic ecosystem. The
aquatic ecosystem is modeled by a lake inhabited
by a commercially valuable fish species. Water
availability in the system is determined by the highly
variable monthly inflow to the delta. The water is
used to produce crops, i.e., irrigation system, and to
sustain viable fish populations in the lake. The latter
depend on inflow of offspring with the water inflow
to the lake from more suitable habitats upstream.
The social system is composed of actors at different
levels that interact with other actors, the irrigation
system, and the ecological system, and take water
allocation decisions to sustain their agricultural
production system or the aquatic ecosystem. Actors
engage in crop production and exploit the fish
populations. The actors determine water and fish
extraction levels and timing based on their targeted
yields, expected water availability, their knowledge
on the state and dynamics of the resources, their
expectations on the behavior of other actors in the
system, and their individual goals.
The subsystems are tightly linked through the
exchange of resources, e.g., water, crops, and fish,
mediated by the actors’ decisions to use or allocate
them. Withdrawal of water and fish resources by the
actors establishes an indirect relation between the
actors in the system because of their location relative
to the water flow and their access to the fish
resources (Fig. 3). An actor that comes to use the
resource will find it influenced, i.e., less water, less
fish, by the ones that have used it before in time or
space (Anderies et al. 2004). The interactions
between the social system and the resources
represent the structure of management, i.e., the
governance system, which will be varied and
investigated with the model.
Figure 3 gives an overview of the general structure
of the model and the distribution of the resources
and agents in space. This spatial arrangement
roughly corresponds to the irrigation system in the
Amudarya delta. Actors are represented at different
national and local organizational levels. They can
be individuals such as farmers, or regulators such
as a national authority. Agents at different levels
have different goals and different information on
resource availability. They make decisions on the
amount of resource extraction and collect
information on resources dynamics and other
agents’ behavior. On the local level farmers extract
water to irrigate their fields according to their
location along the river. They benefit from direct
use of the water for irrigated agriculture and indirect
use through the exploitation of the fish resources.
The success of individual agents, the overall social
system, as well as the state of the human-used
ecosystem depends on local water availability.
In the following the representations of the water
resources and three subsystems are explained in
more detail.
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Fig. 1. Map of the Amudarya River delta in Central Asia. The delta is located in the Republic of
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and the Autonomous Republic of Karakalpakstan (Uzbekistan). Water
distribution in the delta region is largely determined by the Tyuyamuyun system of single-year
reservoirs at the entrance to the delta. Water is diverted into a vast network of irrigation and drainage
canals. The lakes in the northern part of the delta are intensively used for fishing. Source: modified from
Aral Sea GIS (Micklin et al. 1998).
Ecology and Society 12(2): 4
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol12/iss2/art4/
Fig. 2. Conceptual model of the social-ecological system in the river delta showing the major linkages
between the water resources that supply the irrigation system and the aquatic ecosystem, which both
support the social system.
Water resources
In the current version of the model the water
resources are considered as a one-dimensional
downstream flow of water that is tapped
sequentially by each farmer. Inflow to the delta area
is given by the river flow to the delta from upstream
modeled by a 15–year characteristic historical
monthly runoff time series (Schlüter et al. 2005,
Schlüter et al. 2006). Water entering the delta
directly reaches the first farmer. In this version there
is no reservoir for water storage. The aquatic
ecosystem in a lake that is located downstream of
the irrigation area receives the flow left after all
farmers extracted the amount of water allocated to
them.
Irrigation system and crop production
The water extracted from the river by the farmers is
used to irrigate the number of fields determined by
themselves or the national authority at the beginning
of each season. During the vegetation season from
April to September, farmers irrigate their fields
every month. They withdraw water according to the
allocation schemes determined at the beginning of
the season. If the amount of water actually reaching
the fields is less than the amount needed to irrigate
the given number of fields, then water stress occurs.
Water stress accumulates over the season and
affects yields according to the following
relationship (Eq. 1):
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Fig. 3. The general structure of the model, which is then modified for each specific model
implementation, e.g., the centralized and the decentralized models presented here. Agents take water
allocation decisions at both global and local levels. Farmers extract water resources for irrigation
sequentially according to their location along the river. All farmers can additionally access fish
resources in the lake, however downstream farmers can access them prior to upstream farmers.
(1)
where Yj,t = yield of farmer j at time t; Ymax=
maximum yield; NF,j=number of fields of farmer j;
VR,m=received water volume in month m; and VD,m 
= demanded water volume in month m.
This linear relationship of water deficit to yield is
an approximation that does not take into account
that the plants are affected by water stress to
different degrees depending on their development
stage and the severity of water scarcity. For cotton,
the decrease in yield with decrease in water supply
is not totally linear, rather, it decreases slightly
slower than the water supply. Thus, in the case of
cotton, the model overestimates the effect of water
stress on yield to some extent. For other crops, such
as maize, it is the other way around.
Aquatic ecosystem and fish populations
The fish population model is a discrete-time Leslie
matrix model of an age-structured population. The
zero age class contains fish born by the age classes
5–12 as well as larvae, which have migrated into
the lake from upstream (Eq. 2). The reproduction
rate is density dependent. Inflow of larvae from
upstream can only take place if the river flow to the
lake in May is above a certain threshold. Survival
of the fish in the juvenile age classes 1–4 is density
dependent because individuals compete for the
same resources. Only adult fish from age class 5
onwards are harvested. All fish older than 12 yr die.
(2)
where N0,t=number of individuals in 0 age class at
time t; Nn,t=number of individuals in n age class at
time t; It=immigration of offspring at time t; α=birth
rate, σ=strength of density dependence; β=
environmental mortality; γ=density dependent
mortality.
The model was calibrated to reflect the current
nonviable state of fish populations in the aquatic
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ecosystems of the northern delta. Due to severe
changes in the hydrological regime and a massive
loss of spawning habitats, fish populations in the
deltaic lakes cannot produce sufficient offspring to
sustain their populations. Hence, they are dependent
on inflow of offspring from upstream (Joldasova et
al. 2002). This natural stocking mechanism creates
exploitable fish populations in the lakes (Joldasova
et al. 2003). The fish model was thus parameterized
such that population growth is dependent on
sufficient inflow of larvae. The inflow of larvae is
dependent on the water inflow to the lake in May,
which is the month of reproduction. The number of
larvae transported into the lake is proportional to
the water volume after the flow has passed a
threshold value. Flow velocity below the threshold
is too low to ensure the survival of the eggs and
larvae.
Social system and agents
The choice of how to represent the behavior of
human actors in an agent-based model has a strong
influence on model results. Gintis (2000)
highlighted the implications of increasingly
relaxing assumptions of the rational actor paradigm
on the outcome of strategic interactions. Hare and
Pahl-Wostl (2001) analyzed the impact of different
behavioral types on simulation outcomes in a model
that investigated the effectiveness of policy
measures in influencing farmer behavior. They
showed that the sensitivity of model results to
structural uncertainties in the social model largely
exceeded the effect of parameter uncertainties in the
natural system. In this paper we have chosen an
approach that aims at representing the behavior of
rational agents in what is generally considered a
more realistic approach than the rational actor
paradigm from neoclassical economics. It is
assumed that actors behave boundedly rational
(Simon 1957) and because of limited information
processing capacity rely on heuristics or hypotheses
to guide their behavior (Ostrom et al. 1994, Ostrom
1999). The individual actor’s heuristics are based
on his past experience, knowledge of resources
dynamics, expected water availability, and the
expected behavior of other actors. Agents use a form
of inductive reasoning (Deadman et al. 2000). They
tend to stick to their past behavior and vary it only
slightly as long as it produces satisfying results.
Hence, agents are “satisficers” rather than
optimizers. Individual farmers engage in a process
of trial and error to determine their optimal harvest
level or to reach harvest levels that satisfy their basic
needs. Collective actors, i.e., national authority, aim
to achieve global agricultural production goals. The
heuristics have been developed based on empirical
knowledge from the case study river basin and using
theoretical approaches of bounded rationality
(Gigerenzer and Selten 2001, Ebenhoeh and Pahl-
Wostl 2007).
In the current water management regime farmers in
the Amudarya River basin are informed by the
authorities about how much water they will receive
to irrigate the number of fields and crops that have
been determined based on state cropping plans. The
government makes predictions on water availability
by comparing current flow patterns with flow
patterns observed in the past. Farmers have only
little information on expected water availability,
which in combination with wrong planning of the
government can lead to severe crop losses. The
heuristics for the decision making of the
government and the farmer agents have been based
on those empirical observations as well as the
assumptions that agents have only limited
information processing capacities and might follow
other goals besides profit maximization, e.g.
maintenance of a certain income level.
In the following the functions for the estimation of
water availability and the calculation of global and
individual returns are given. The actors’ decision
rules to choose the number of fields to irrigate are
explained later when describing the different
regimes.
Estimation of water availability
Agents estimate water availability each season by
evaluating the observed water flows from previous
years during the peak month of July, i.e., either by
the national authority at the inflow to the delta, i.e.,
a centralized regime, or by farmers along the
irrigation network, i.e., a decentralized regime (Eq.
3). Because of different access to information or
memory capacities of the agents, the number of past
years included in the estimation of the current water
availability can vary. These differences are
incorporated into Eq. 3 through the coefficient delta
raised to the power of the number of past years,
representing the weight of preceding years. It
decreases with distance from the current year. If
delta = 1 the expected water availability is the
arithmetic mean of the years up to the current year,
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and if delta << 1 water availability of the
immediately preceding years dominate the
prediction (Fig. 4). The smaller delta the more the
estimates try to capture the fluctuations in the
availability of the resource. Delta is a measure of
the uncertainty the agents face in determining the
amount of irrigated land and thus the agricultural
investment for the current season. 
(3)
where V7E=expected water volume in month 7; V7R=
received water volume in month 7; δ=strength of
memory of water availability in past years.
Accumulation of financial capital: local and
global returns
At the end of the season, each farmer determines his
individual accumulated returns, i.e., local returns/
financial reserve of the farmer, which is the
accumulated return from the previous year plus the
current agricultural yield and fish catch reduced by
the costs for irrigation and consumption in the
current year as shown in Eq. 4. One unit of fish is
equivalent to 10 units of agricultural yield (scaling
factor λ = 10), which reflects the empirical
relationship of relative incomes from the two types
of resources in the study area. 
(4)
where Rj,t=accumulated local returns of farmer j at
time t; Yj,t=yield of farmer j at time t; λ=scaling
factor for income from fish catch; Hj,t=fish catch of
farmer I at time t; CI,j,t=irrigation costs of farmer I
at time t; CC,j,t=consumption costs of farmer j at time
t.
The irrigation costs are fixed costs for the irrigation
of a standard field with the standard crop, i.e., 5
units/field, multiplied by the number of fields
irrigated. Consumption covers the annual expenses
of a household independent of any agricultural or
fishing activity. It is assumed constant and the same
for each household, i.e., 40 units/yr. Consumption
reflects the minimum amount of resources the
household needs to survive. It thus cannot be
reduced in low water years.
The global accumulated returns, i.e., financial
reserves of the national authority, are determined as
follows (Eq. 5). Note that income from fishing is
not included in the global returns, because fishing
activities are local subsistence activities and returns
remain with the individual farmers. However, they
enable the farmer to invest more into agriculture and
thus indirectly influence global returns.
(5)
 
 where Rtotal,t=global returns at time t; CI,total=sum
of irrigation costs of all farmers; CC,total=sum of
consumption of all farmers; Ytotal=sum of yields of
all farmers.
APPLICATION
In the following section, implementations of
simplified centralized and decentralized management
regimes are presented. In a centralized, top-down
water management regime, the national authority at
the global level formulates an allocation strategy,
which is motivated by the aim to maximize global
agricultural production. Farmers execute the orders
from the national authority and irrigate the assigned
number of fields. The national authority does not
consider fishing as an additional income source.
Farmers are free to fish in their spare time; however,
the returns from this activity remain with the farmer
and are not available for farming investments of the
national authority. This regime caricatures features
of the current water management practices in the
river basin. In a decentralized, bottom-up
management regime, on the contrary, the individual
farmers themselves determine their strategies of
water extraction aimed at increasing their local
agricultural production. In the simplest case of open
access to the water resources the global water
allocation scheme emerges from the actions of the
individuals. Subsistence fishing contributes to the
farmer’s individual income.
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Fig. 4. Prediction of expected water availability with delta = 0, 0.5 and 1 compared to real water flows
during the peak month, i.e., July of each year.
Both regimes are compared as to their local and
global performance under different scenarios of
information on water availability. A reference run
in which the national authority has complete
information on water availability in July was carried
out for comparison. The quality of information on
past water flows influences the quality of the
prediction of expected water availability in the
current year and thus the actor’s response to
variability in water availability and his success in
irrigation. Uncertainty of water availability is a
major challenge actors in the Amudarya River basin
have to deal with. Scenarios run for 200 yr, and
scenarios of both the centralized and decentralized
models without fishing activities of the farmers will
be presented to compare the effects of the different
governance regimes on performance. An analysis
of the effect of fishing follows.
Allocation and fishing decision making in the
centralized and decentralized regimes
Figures 5 and 6 show activity diagrams of the
centralized (Fig. 5) and the decentralized (Fig 6.)
models. The agents make their decisions on the
number of fields to irrigate each season based on
their assessment of water availability and the
financial resources available to them. In the
centralized regime (Fig. 5) the national authority
determines how many fields can be irrigated with
the expected amount of water, and given that it has
enough financial reserves, equally distributes the
amounts of water to withdraw for irrigation of the
assigned number of fields to the farmers. If it is not
sufficient, the national authority reduces the number
of fields to the amount that can be financed.
Contrary to the national authority farmers in the
decentralized regime (Fig. 6) do not have
information on real flows in the river and thus have
to base their assessment of water availability on
observations of the amounts of water they received
in the past. In part this corresponds to reality since
individual farmers do not have the possibility to
measure water flows at the entrance to the delta,
however, they most likely do observe real water
availability at their location with simple means.
Farmers try to determine their realistic limits to
water withdrawal by trial and error. Besides
assessing local water availability individual farmers
also assess their personal income situation. If the
past yield is below the minimum income
requirements the farmer will increase the number
of fields hoping that in the current year water
availability will be higher again, but also risking of
losing his investment to irrigate those fields. If his
demands have not been met in the previous year but
his income needs have been satisfied he will not risk
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and rather irrigate the number of fields suitable for
the amount of water he expects. Again, the amount
of fields irrigated is constrained by the financial
reserves of the individual agent. Besides, there is an
upper limit to the number of fields an individual
farmer, in the decentralized version, or the total
number of fields the national authority, in the
centralized version, can irrigate.
All farmers can fish at no cost in their spare time
without any effect on their agricultural activities.
The last farmer downstream can access the fish
resources first, because he is located closest to the
lake. The other farmers access the lake in order of
their distance from the lake. Each farmer tries to
catch as many fish as given by the fixed target catch
level, i.e., number of fish/yr*farmer. All farmers
have the same target catch level. Fish are caught
randomly from one of the adult age classes. If there
are no fish left in the selected age class the farmer
has an unsuccessful attempt to catch fish.
At the end of each season, farmers harvest the fields
and in some scenarios they fish. The local and global
returns are assessed and added to the financial
reserve.
Performance of the centralized and
decentralized regimes without fishing
Figures 7a and 7b show the global accumulated
returns at the end of the simulation for the different
delta scenarios with changes in the maximum total
number of fields, i.e., centralized, or maximum
number of fields/farmer, i.e., decentralized. The
maximum number of fields/farmer (maxfields) in
the decentralized regime determines the maximum
amount of water one farmer can withdraw for
irrigation and thus the maximum returns he can
receive. It can be seen that the global accumulated
returns are higher for the centralized regime for most
values of delta and maxnumfields. In both regimes
the performance increases with an increase in
quality of estimation of water availability (delta).
However, although this is linear in the centralized
case, highest performance in the decentralized case
are with intermediate values of delta, except for high
maxfield values. It can also be seen that with low
deltas both regimes break down. Although in the
centralized case the breakdown only occurs with
delta <= 0.2, in the decentralized case breakdown
happens with delta <= 0.4, depending on the
maximum number of fields/farmer. The maximum
global accumulated return in the centralized model
with delta = 1 is 8045. This is still half as much as
with perfect knowledge on water availability in July
(16581).
The increase in accumulated global returns with
delta can be explained by the better estimation of
number of fields to irrigate which increases returns
on irrigation costs. Total yields remain almost equal
for delta > 0.1 (centralized) and delta > 0.5
(decentralized). The breakdown in the low delta
scenarios occurs because losses have reduced the
individual or global financial reserves to an extent
that there is no financial capital left to sustain
consumption and provide investment for the next
irrigation season.
The maximum number of fields that the national
authority can irrigate does not have an effect on the
outcome above a value of approximately 140 fields.
A total of 72 fields that produce maximum yield are
needed to compensate for consumption and
irrigation costs/yr in both regimes. However, due to
imprecise estimation of water availability
maximum yield cannot be achieved on all fields. In
the decentralized regime, the maximum number of
fields each farmer can irrigate affects total returns
up to a value of 70 fields/farmer. With high
maximum numbers of fields/farmer, the system
becomes more like a single user system, which is
similar to a centralized regime, because the first few
farmers upstream can use most of the water. With
intermediate number of fields/farmer, e.g., 35 – 55
fields/farmer, and delta values between 0.3 and 0.6,
the system performance is very low. In those cases
the net losses in low water years are higher than the
net gains in high water years, often because a farmer
with intermediate income crossed a critical
threshold to sustain his irrigation and went out of
business. This causes the total performance to
decrease.
Besides the maximum number of fields a farmer can
irrigate, outcomes of the decentralized regime are
sensitive to the minimum yield a farmer uses as a
threshold for a decision to increase the number of
irrigation fields. The minimum yield requirement is
an indicator of the risk a farmer is willing to take
and is discussed in more detail in the annex.
The distribution of yields of individual farmers
strongly varies with delta as well as between the two
regimes (Fig. 8). Generally, yields are more equally
distributed among upstream and downstream
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Fig. 5. Activity diagram of the centralized model. Sequence of activities within 1 yr (t). EWA(t)=
expected water availability in mo 7 of yr t, RWV(t)= requested water volume in mo 7 of yr t, Total IC =
total costs of irrigating the total amount of fields, NAFR = Financial Reserve of the National Authority,
cropneed = water needed to irrigate one field of the respective crop, and cropcost = cost of cultivating
the crop on one field.
farmers in the centralized regime. This is in the
nature of the allocation mechanisms, which in the
centralized regime allocates resources equally to all
farmers. Nevertheless, inaccurate estimations of
water availability by the national authority affect
the downstream farmers first, lowering their
individual performance and making it more
variable. With the low quality assessment of water
availability, i.e., delta = 0 and 0.1, farmers obtain
yields only in single years, mainly during the
beginning of the simulation. With delta = 1 the
number of irrigated fields converges to an average
value, which is lower and has stronger variations
the further downstream a farmer is located.
However, since farmers receive all capital they need
to irrigate their fields from the national authority
they can plant even if their individual financial
reserves would be too low.
In the decentralized model, benefits from resource
use are distributed very unevenly. The first three
farmers can produce high yields no matter how good
their estimation of water availability. Yields of the
upstream farmers are much higher than the
downstream ones and much higher, i.e., up to 3.5
times for farmer 1, than in the centralized model.
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Fig. 6. Activity diagram of the decentralized model. Sequence of activities within 1 yr (t). EWA(t)=
expected water availability in mo 7 of yr t, RWV(t)= requested water volume in mo 7 of yr t, DWV(t) =
delivered water volume in mo 7 of yr t, Y(t) = yield in yr t, IC = costs of irrigating the total number of
fields, FR = financial reserve, cropneed = water needed to irrigate one field of the respective crop, and
cropcost = cost of cultivating the crop on one field.
With better estimations, more farmers can irrigate,
but in all scenarios, farmers 6 to 9 eventually go out
of business.
The abundance of fish in the adult age classes in the
centralized regime without fishing is similar in all
but the delta = 0.8 and 0.9 scenarios where it is
approximately 35% higher (Fig. 9a). Here, inflow
to the lake crosses the threshold in more years then
in the other scenarios, thus creating a larger inflow
of larvae into the lake. The inflow of larvae is
significantly higher with delta = 0 and 0.1, because
in these scenarios less water is used in agriculture
and instead reaches the lake (Figure 9b). However,
due to the very high inflow density regulation
prevents the adult age classes from growing
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Fig. 7. Total accumulated global returns at the end of the simulation period (yr 200) with change in the
maximum total number of fields (centralized) or maximum number of fields/farmer (decentralized) for
the a) centralized and b) decentralized models without fishing, and c) decentralized with fishing. D)
Comparison of the total accumulated global returns at the end of the simulation period of the centralized,
decentralized without fishing and decentralized with fishing for a run with maximum number of fields/
farmer = 20.
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Fig. 8. Annual yields/farmer for delta = 0 and delta = 1 for the a) centralized and b) decentralized
models without fishing. Parameter values are the same as in Fig. 6, i.e., max. number of fields–
centralized: 180, maximum number of fields/farmer–decentralized: 20.
equivalently. In the decentralized model without
fishing abundances in the adult age classes are
higher because fewer active farmers use less water
in agriculture, which leads to a higher inflow of
larvae into the lake. Fishing decreases fish
abundance but also the inflow to the lake because
with the additional income from fishing, farmers
perform better in agriculture and use more of the
available water. Fish catch is almost identical in all
delta scenarios.
Diversification of resources use: the impact of
fishing
When farmers additionally engage in fishing
activities the yields and the local and global
accumulated returns change; some of them
significantly. Here, only the impact of fishing on
the global accumulated returns (Fig. 7c) and the
individual returns of the last farmer (Fig. 10) in the
decentralized regime can be presented. Note that the
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Fig. 9.. A) Total mean abundance in adult age classes of the fish population with different deltas for the
centralized, decentralized without fishing, and decentralized with fishing models. Mean catch for the
decentralized model with fishing. B) Mean inflow of larvae into the fish population with different delta
for the centralized, decentralized without fishing, and decentralized with fishing models. Parameter
values are the same as in Fig. 6.
global accumulated returns in the scenarios with
fishing summarize only the returns from crop
production, not fishing, so that all scenarios can be
compared directly. The increase in global returns is
caused by the indirect compensatory effect of
fishing on the individual level in low water years.
The individual returns that each farmer can generate
by fishing depend on the state of the fish population,
which is a function of water inflow, his access to
them, and the target catch level. With low target
catch levels, all farmers can succeed in catching fish,
and with higher levels, the first farmers accessing
the lake deplete the resources (see also sensitivity
analysis in Appendix).
Results show that the income from fishing activities
create a buffer in low water years that prevents the
farmer from going out of business and allows him
to retain sufficient financial resources to invest in
agriculture in the next year. This effect is especially
pronounced in the low delta scenarios (0–0.4),
where high uncertainty in water availability has
caused the system without fishing to break down.
Moreover, differences in returns between the
different delta scenarios are much smaller. The
performance of the decentralized regime is better
than without fishing (Fig. 7d) and compares well
with the centralized regime with high delta values
and performs better in the low delta range. The
decrease in differences between the performance of
the centralized and decentralized regime also holds
when the returns from fishing are included into the
global returns of both regimes.
The maximum number of fields a farmer can irrigate
(maxfields) influence outcomes for low delta values
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Fig. 10. Individual returns over time of farmer 9 for delta 0, 0.1, 0.2, ...., 1. Parameter values are the
same as in Fig. 6, except for target catch level h=100.
(0–0.2). However the impact is not as strong as
without fishing. Fishing activities prevent the
decline for intermediate values as in the scenario
without fishing. Outcomes of the decentralized
model are sensitive to the fish population growth,
and the scaling factor for income of fishing,
especially for low delta values and low values of the
respective parameters (see sensitivity analysis in
Appendix).
Fishing activities reduce the fluctuations in the
individual returns of each farmer, especially the
downstream ones. The lower the potential income
from agriculture for the downstream farmers in the
decentralized model, the higher their fish catch has
to be to achieve income levels that enable the farmer
to invest in agriculture. It also takes significant time
until fish population dynamics and catches are
stabilized and the downstream farmers can increase
their individual returns (Fig. 10). There is thus a
trade-off between decrease in agricultural returns
and increase in fishing returns with increasing
distance down the river. If farmers go out of business
water use for agriculture is reduced, which improves
the state of the fish population.
DISCUSSION
The two regimes presented in the example
caricaturize a centralized and a decentralized regime
of water allocation decision making. The structural
differences between the two regimes are manifested
in the level at which information on past water flows
is generated, at which allocation decisions are taken
and returns are accumulated. While the centralized
regime has access to information of total water flows
into the region, and takes allocation decisions that
aim to optimize return at the global level using
global financial resources, the decentralized regime
has information on flows received at a certain
location along the river, and takes allocation
decisions that aim to increase individual returns
using the available individual financial resources.
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Both regimes are exposed to disturbances in the
form of regularly recurring low water years. In the
modeling exercise two mechanisms that might
affect the resilience of both regimes are tested: (1)
the potential to estimate the state of the resource to
reduce the uncertainty of water availability and (2)
diversification of water use.
Both mechanisms have an effect on the performance
and thus resilience of both regimes. The quality of
the prediction of water flows (delta), which is
influenced by the memory capacity of each agent,
determines its adaptive response to changes in water
availability. With the given regularly fluctuating
flow pattern the centralized regime performs better
with increasing delta. Highest returns are achieved
when the national authority uses the approximated
mean water availability as a predictor, thus
neglecting annual fluctuations. In the decentralized
regime, however, an increase of delta can improve
performance only to a certain extent with returns
decreasing again when delta approaches 1. An
interesting extension for future simulations will be
to test the effect of heterogeneous agents that have
different deltas, or can adjust their delta through
learning.
Diversification of water use increases the resilience
of both regimes to low water years and forecasting
errors. Fishing activities act as a linkage between
upstream and downstream water use, because the
order of access to the fish resources is opposite to
the access to water resources. This can increase the
performance of the decentralized system with high
fishing levels even beyond that of the centralized
one because water resources can be used more
efficiently. The contribution of this alternative
water use to the individual returns could even be
increased if the water and thus larvae inflow to the
ecosystem would be actively managed. Understanding
the resolution of the trade-off between different
water uses is one question we intend to address using
the model.
In the given version the centralized regime performs
better because decisions taken by the national
authority equalize access for all farmers to sufficient
levels of water and financial resources for cropping.
The regime can thus make better use of high water
years, which increases returns. However, when
performance is too low to sustain all individuals the
centralized system completely breaks down, while
in the decentralized case the upstream farmers can
still survive. In such a case the complete
independence of the individual agents proves to be
an advantage. Otherwise, in the decentralized
regime the lack of institutions that regulate access
to the resources and/or of coordination among
agents forces downstream farmers out of business
in low water years. They cannot resume agricultural
activities because of insufficient financial
resources. Abundant water resources in high water
years can thus not be used for irrigation any longer.
By subsidizing the downstream farmers the
centralized regime can use the water resources more
efficiently.
Interestingly, the situation of unequal water
distribution seen to emerge in the decentralized
model without fishing has been observed in the
Amudarya river basin during the severe drought
years 2000 and 2001. During the drought the
downstream users often received less than half the
allotment of “normal” mean water availability
years, which the upstream users continued to receive
even at historically low river flows. Thus, although
the centralized regime was intended to mimic the
structure of the current water management regime,
the current regime shows behavior closer to that of
the decentralized one. In the reality of water
management in the Amudarya River basin, regional
and local level authorities often do not comply with
the orders from the national government and
manage the resources according to their own rules
(R. Yalcin, personal communication).
Excessive use of water for irrigation combined with
heavy fishing can reduce the fish population to very
small numbers. However, fish populations can
rebound when a decrease in agricultural activities
increases the inflow of offspring. This may happen
when the downstream farmers go out of business
and only rely on fishing. The resilience of the virtual
fish population is thus a function of the inflow of
offspring, which might be an over-simplification of
the actual ecological dynamics.
Model outputs suggest that the governance structure
expressed in the two regimes has a significant effect
on the resilience of the coupled system. Model runs
without diversification and other institutions to
regulate resource access indicate that the
participation of more, especially local, actors in the
decision does not enhance the system’s resilience,
contrary to some empirical studies (Ostrom 1990,
Tang 1992). Moreover, increasing the number of
agents taking individual decisions increases the
inequality among agents (see also Janssen 2007).
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However, these results should be interpreted with
caution given the simplistic implementation of the
decentralized regime, which neglects communication
and collective action among the individual actors or
the emergence of a market for land or water.
Besides, the superiority of the centralized regime,
which in the best scenario has a 40% higher return
than in the decentralized regime, might decrease or
vanish once aspects of noncompliance with the rules
from the national authority and nonregular
fluctuations in water availability are taken into
account. Noncompliance and free riding are
fundamental problems in common-pool resource
management, which affect both types of regimes.
Empirical evidence suggests that in some situations
self-governance is better capable of coping with
them (Ostrom 1990, Tang 1992).
The model structure proved useful first as a vehicle
to formalize our ideas about the core differences in
structural and functional characteristics of agent-
resource interactions between centralized and
decentralized regimes. Second, contrasting the
outputs of different regimes was valuable to
investigate the impact of these characteristics and
related uncertainties in resources availability on the
resilience of the coupled system. We have chosen
these simplified representations in order to allow
for a systematic testing of the effects of structural
characteristics on resilience. However, the use of an
agent-based approach gives us the opportunity to
test the resilience of alternative regimes that differ
in human factors and behaviors such as cooperation
and collective action. To further investigate those
characteristics the decision making structure and
interactions between agents and resources will be
systematically varied. In the next modeling steps we
want to carry out an exploration of what individual
behaviors and simple rules can improve the
performance of the bottom-up regime (see also
Anderies 2000 for an example of traditional
societies). This includes increasing the possibilities
for agents to adapt their strategies based on the
experiences they gain, addressing issues of
noncompliance of agents, heterogeneity of agent
behavior and in particular institutions for collective
action. Further, the impact of the buffering capacity
of a water storage reservoir or the fish population
will be investigated. Another interesting question is
how information availability and transfer as well as
the level of strategic planning influences the
capacity of the agents and the system to adapt. In
the current regimes in the Amudarya River basin
there is little strategic planning because the
government today is mainly concerned with day-to-
day operational management (I. Abdullaev,
personal communication).
Limitations of agent-based approaches lie in the
restricted possibilities for formal verification and
validation. The sensitivity analysis of the
decentralized regime confirms that when
information on water flows is very limited, i.e., low
delta values, the tradeoff between water use for
irrigation and water use for fish production strongly
determines the performance of the system. In those
scenarios outcomes are sensitive to changes in any
of the determining parameters for fish population
growth and agricultural production. This tradeoff
will be the subject of further investigations with the
model in the future. Moreover, more analyses have
to be carried out to further test whether management
strategies are robust under various equally plausible
assumptions on agent behavior and to analyze the
coupling of the social and ecological systems. In
this respect, an advantage of a heuristics-based
approach to model agent decision making is the
possibility to validate rules with stakeholders on the
ground or through field work that may include
stakeholder analysis and knowledge elicitation in
interviews, questionnaires and role-playing games
(Barreteau et al. 2001).
CONCLUSION
The models presented here are a first attempt to
develop simple models to systematically test
structural and functional mechanisms that influence
the response to disturbances of a coupled social-
ecological system in a river basin. Such models can
be valuable tools to identify potential mechanisms
of resilience of specific social-ecological systems,
e.g. in a common pool resource management
situation. The two examples of a simple centralized
and a decentralized regime show that under the
given conditions the centralized system performed
better as long as there is only one type of water use,
e.g., irrigation, and variability in water availability
is predictable. However, relaxing some of the strong
assumptions on resources and agent behavior might
reveal that a well designed decentralized regime
performs better, as is already the case in the simple
examples with high fishing activities. Careful
analysis of such models can reveal robust structural
features and rule sets that are little sensitive to the
assumptions about agent behavior and learning.
We want to emphasize the need to study the
dynamics of coupled social-ecological systems,
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especially their capacity to cope with change, as a
theoretical basis for ecosystem and resource
management. The given approach uses a real world
example as context to explore theoretical issues
such as implications of structural organization for
the functioning of the system. Better understanding
of system dynamics and the source and role of
change in adaptive systems will assist identification,
design and evaluation of management interventions
and can inform an adaptive management process.
In a river basin that historically has been
conservatively managed from the top down, it is
difficult to imagine how innovations at local and
national levels might interact to affect water use,
economy and society or, ultimately, their resilience
to various sources of uncertainty and change. The
model so far has shown potential for analysis of
different policy options and their implications.
Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol12/iss2/art4/responses/
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